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1 Introduction
Labor markets are moving beyond standard work arrangements, blurring the boundaries of tradi-
tional employment. Temporary agency work (TAW), also known as temporary help jobs, is one
of the most rapidly growing forms of alternative employment. Temporary agency work involves a
specific type of contractual relationship in which workers are hired by an agency and temporarily
assigned to work in another firm, creating a triangular relationship between the worker, the tempo-
rary agency, and the user firm. While this type of employment may offer more flexibility to firms, it
is less clear what its effects are on workers. Indeed, the increasing use of TAW has not only raised
public interest in the working conditions of agency workers, but has also led to the enactment of
labor regulations in many countries, especially in the European Union.
Beginning with the seminal work by Saint-Paul (2002), most of the literature has focused on
understanding the economic effects of dual labor markets on firms and workers, and research on
temporary agency work is not an exception. Researchers have offered several reasons why firms may
use TAW. These include suggestions that agency workers can provide a flexible buffer for times of
uncertainty or for demand fluctuations (Houseman, 2001; Houseman et al., 2003; Jahn and Bentzen,
2010), that agency employment can be used to circumvent regulations that make labor adjustments
costly (Bauman et al., 2011; Boeri, 2010, Autor, 2013), and that temporary work agencies can help
user firms to screen workers (Autor, 2003). In keeping with the idea that TAW aids in the pro-
cess of screening potential employees, others have suggested that TAW may be a stepping-stone
into stable and regular employment (i.e. Ichino et al., 2006; Jahn and Rosholm, 2013). However,
researchers have documented that agency workers have less access to training and face a higher
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risk of unemployment (Nienhu¨ser and Matiaske, 2006; Autor and Houseman, 2010). An interesting
study in this vein is Hirsch (2016), who shows that the job stability of non-agency workers may rise
at the expense of temporary agency workers, a consequence of firms using TAW as a volatility buffer.
Although the literature has examined why firms use TAW and how TAW affects job stability for
agency and non-agency workers alike, empirical evidence on the effects of tightened TAW-specific
regulation is sparse, and has mainly focused on the effects of deregulation. For instance, Antoni
and Jahn (2009) use administrative data to study the deregulation of the legal framework governing
temporary agency work in Germany during the 90s. They find that the increase in the maximum
period of assignment had a positive impact on the number of temporary help agencies, and the
number of agency workers. Similarly, Autor (2003) studies the effect of state-level deregulation of
temporary help services during 1973 and 1995. Using regional variation of employment protection
legislation he shows that states that adopted exceptions to the “unjust dismissal” clause increased
the use of temporary workers. Research on the relationship between TAW and productivity is also
scarce, and seems to suggest a non-trivial relationship between the level of TAW and plant produc-
tivity. For instance, Nielsen and Schiersch (2014) find an inverted U-shaped relationship between
productivity and the share of total labor costs spent on TAW, and Hirsch and Mueller (2012) re-
port a maximum productivity effect of 14% in plants with a share of TAW of around 10%. In this
context, our contribution to the existing literature is to provide evidence on the short-run effects
of extending employment protection for agency workers on the demand for them and through that
on plants’ performance.
We study the case of Chile, a middle-income country that instituted a regulation that protects
agency workers in 2007, and for which plant-level data on agency employment is available. Chile
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is a compelling case to study since it was a pioneer in the use of TAW as well as in its regulatory
framework. The country enacted a labor law that regulates the use of TAW in the same spirit of
the EU Directive (see Temporary Agency Work Directive 2008/104/EC). This law—called “Ley
de Subcontratacio´n” (Law No. 20,123)—regulated agency work for the first time in the country,
thereby making user firms accountable for the legal rights of the workers hired through an employ-
ment agency. Specifically, the law made user firms jointly liable for agency workers’ labor benefits
such as severance payments, pension, and unemployment insurance, as well as for work-related
injuries, illnesses, and fatalities. The reform also mandated that employment agencies constitute a
financial guarantee on behalf of the Labor Directorate to cover the unpaid social contributions of
workers hired through employment agencies.
These new legal requirements leveled conditions between regular and agency workers within the
workplace, increasing the cost of using TAW de facto. Studying the Chilean manufacturing sector,
we find strong evidence that the 2007 regulation reduced the use of TAW in both the extensive
and intensive margins. Right after the regulation was enacted, the probability of using TAW de-
creased by 20%, and conditional on using TAW, the share of agency workers over total employment
decreased by 5%. In line with existing research studying Europe and the United States,1 we also
find that larger plants facing more volatile environments rely more on TAW, and we show that the
relationship between these variables and the demand for TAW became stronger after the regulation.
To study the impact of this reform on plant performance, we leverage time variation around the
time of the regulation and group variation between TAW-users and TAW-nonuser plants (based
on their pre-reform levels of TAW use). Our main results show that plants using TAW before the
regulation increased non-agency employment by 9.2% but experienced a decrease in total employ-
1See Abraham and Taylor (1996), Jahn and Bentzen (2010), Hirsch and Mueller (2012) and Aleksynska and Berg
(2016).
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ment of 8.6%. Reassuringly, plants with higher shares of agency workers —which were consequently
more exposed to the regulatory change—experienced larger changes in employment. We find less
precise evidence of a negative scale effect on output (ranging from -14% to -1.6%) and weaker but
suggestive evidence of a negative effect on profits. Finally, we perform a series of specification
checks. Results are robust to including plants’ unobservable characteristics related to the decision
of using agency workers (i.e., a control function approach) and also to models that account for
pre-trends, either by including plant-specific time trends or lagged dependent variable.
A descriptive analysis of TAW in the Chilean manufacturing sector highlights the relevance of
the 2007 regulation. As shown in Figure 1, the share of TAW increased steadily before the reform,
with agency employment peaking at 12.5% of total employment in 2006. This trend broke immedi-
ately after the law was enacted, and the use of TAW decreased until it reached a plateau of around
10% in 2011. This regulation had an important impact on the extensive margin. A decomposition
of the aggregate share of TAW into the share of plants using TAW, the share of TAW within firms
using TAW, and the relative size of plants using TAW, shows that the percentage of plants using
agency workers decreased, and the relative size of the plants that used TAW increased. Indeed,
one-third of plants used TAW in 2006 whereas only one-fourth used this type of employment in
2011. We interpret this finding as evidence of an increase in the fixed costs related to the use of
agency workers, although we cannot disentangle whether this increase in fixed costs purely reflects
the increase in the cost of hiring from an agency or whether it is due to higher regulatory burden
or bigger reputational effects for large firms.
To formally analyze the impact of the 2007 reform on the intensive and extensive margins of
TAW use, we use Probit and Tobit models. We also consider a selection correction model in the
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spirit of Heckman (1979) to jointly estimate the effects on the extensive and intensive margins.2
Our main specifications include years dummies to capture the timing of the reform, more than
fifty sector fixed effects, and proxies for plant size and volatility. For simplicity, we define size as
a dummy variable equal to one for plants with total employment (pre-reform) in the top quantile
of the empirical distribution.3 This variable is intended to capture economies of scale or frictions
related to the use of TAW. As our proxy for volatility, we consider the log difference in value-added.
Specifically, we use the fitted value of this difference, which we obtain from a regression of value
added on input and import/export shares multiplied by the log change in prices (input prices and
real exchange rate). Under the assumption that firms are price takers, our proxy for volatility
should be exogenous to plant behavior, and therefore eliminates a reverse causality problem in
which plants facing more volatility may demand more agency workers on one hand, while on the
other hand, the use of TAW provides flexibility and reduces plants’ volatility. Finally, we also
add a set of control variables, including real exchange rate and its interactions with import/export
shares, as well as input prices (manufacturing wage index and energy price index) interacted with
the corresponding input shares.
From our Probit model, we find that the probability of using TAW decreased by 4 percentage
points over a pre-reform base of 19%. Regarding the effects on the share of TAW, conditional on
using agency workers, our estimates from a Tobit model suggest that total employment decreased
by 1 percentage point over a pre-reform base of 20%. Both of these effects are economically and
statistically significant, but the effect of the regulation is almost 4 times larger on the extensive
margin. Our estimates also show a positive relationship of volatility and plant size on the extensive
2An indicator when a plant uses TAW in 2001 (pre-reform) is our excluded “instrument.” Thus, identification is
predicated upon the idea that use of agency workers in 2001 is a good predictor of TAW use in later years, but it is
unrelated to the share of agency workers within a plant.
3All results are robust to alternative definitions of firm size, such as considering the top quartile. Table are
available upon request.
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and intensive margins of TAW use. Interestingly, both variables became more relevant to explain
the variance in the use of agency workers after the reform. Estimates from the selection adjusted
model are quantitatively and qualitatively similar, and they point out the relevance of the extensive
margin effects of the Chilean regulation.
To study the impact on plant performance, we exploit the timing of the reform and whether
plants are classified as TAW-users or not (based on their pre-reform levels of TAW). Pre-trends sug-
gest that there were no significant differences between TAW-user and TAW-nonuser plants in terms
of profits and non-agency employment. However, during the pre-reform period, total employment
and output grew more among TAW-user plants. While the latter pattern violates the parallel trends
assumption, it suggests that estimates without more controls might represent a lower bound on the
effects of the reform on total employment and output. We address this threat to identification by
including plant fixed effects, TAW-user specific time trends, and a control function accounting for
plants’ unobservable characteristics related to the decision of using agency workers. In the spirit
of Card and Krueger (1994), we also estimate differential effects among TAW-user plants based on
their exposure to this reform, i.e. their share of agency workers before regulation. As suggested in
Angrist and Pischke (2008), we check the robustness of our results to models controlling for pre-
trends either using lagged dependent variable or plant-specific trends. All specifications include
the set of control variables used before: real exchange rate and its interactions with import/export
shares, as well as input prices (manufacturing wage index and energy price index) interacted with
the corresponding input shares.
Estimates indicate that TAW-user plants experienced a 9.2% increase in non-agency employ-
ment as a consequence of the regulation. However, their total employment decreased by 8.6%.
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Consistent with this negative scale effect, we find a 5.7% decrease in output and a 1.3% decrease
in profits. Estimates, including a control function to account for unobserved plant heterogeneity,
show even larger effects, with total employment, output, and profits decreasing by 15%, 14%, and
5.6% respectively.4 Reassuringly, plants with a pre-reform share of TAW above the median experi-
enced stronger effects of this regulation. Non-agency employment increased by 22% in plants using
TAW at a high intensity, and this effect is larger and statistically different than the effect of the
regulation on low-intensity TAW users. Total employment also decreased by more in plants that
were more exposed to the regulation. However, we do not find robust evidence of differential effects
within TAW-user on output and profits. Finally, estimates from specifications that include the
lagged dependent variable and firm-specific trends confirm our findings of a negative scale effect on
employment (between -8 % and -6 %) and a positive substitution effect on the use of non-agency
workers (between 4.8% and 6.5%). These models only provide weak evidence of such scale effects
on output and profits.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background of the regulation
and shows its aggregate effects. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 4 is divided
into two parts: in the first, we show the impact of the 2007 reform on the use of TAW, and in the
second, we show the impact of this regulation on plant performance. Section 5 concludes.
2 The TAW regulation and its aggregate effects
Chile experienced a large growth in the number of agency workers at the turn of the twenty-first
century. As a response, labor unions and politicians raised concerns about the impact of this new
4Interestingly, unobservables increasing the use of agency workers are negatively correlated with the use of non-
agency employment and positively correlated with the level of profits made by the plants, suggesting that underlying
factors increasing the benefits of using agency workers are still at play during the post-reform period, e.g. plant
volatility and fixed cost to use TAW.
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type of employment arrangement on workers’ welfare. Public discussion led to a new regulatory
framework for non-standard work arrangements. The aim of this new regulation on agency work
employment, enacted in October 2006 and in force since January 2007, was to level the working
conditions between agency and regular workers, similar in spirit to the European Union Directive
of 2008 (Agency Work Directive 2008/104/EC).
This reform included three main changes. First, under the new law, user firms become ac-
countable for agency workers’ labor rights and the payment of their social security contributions
(See Chilean Labor Code Art. 183). Indeed, user firms became jointly liable for pension and un-
employment insurance contributions, as well as severance payments.5 Second, user firms became
responsible for protecting workers’ safety and health in the workplace, regardless of their contrac-
tual employment status. In the case of violations of the Labor Code involving accidents or health
concerns, agency workers can sue either the agency or the user firm for which they work. Third,
the 2007 reform also stated that agency firms must constitute a financial guarantee on behalf of
the Directorate of Labor, which can be used to cover unpaid social security contributions of agency
workers in case the employment agency does not comply with its legal duties.
The law also gives user firms the right to request information from temporary employment
agencies regarding their compliance with their workers’ labor rights. If the agencies do not prove
that they are complying with their labor regulations on time, then the user firms can withhold
the appropriate amount from the agency fee to comply with agency workers’ labor rights. In cases
where the user firm receives a certificate demonstrating that the agency firm is fulfilling its monthly
5Chile has a retirement fund contribution of 10.0% of salary, an unemployment insurance contribution of 3.0%,
a disability insurance contribution of 1.3%, and a severance payment system (one monthly wage per year up to 11
months). On top of the 10% contributions is the fee charged by the private Pension Fund Administrator (1%). For
a complete description of the system see https://www.spensiones.cl.
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labor obligations, agency workers can sue the user firm only after the prosecution of the agency has
been exhausted. This provision of the law intends to mitigate the new risks faced by user firms in
case the subcontractor firm does not comply with its labor regulations. Indeed, since 2007, a new
industry of private consulting companies that certify labor law compliance of subcontractor firms
has emerged in Chile. Local and international consulting companies like Deloitte, among others,
provide these services.
Summing up, the reform increased the cost of using temporary agency workers. Aside from
the potential increase on variable costs due to the full compliance of labor regulation and social
security contributions, the reform also introduced an explicit fixed cost in the form of a permanent
financial guarantee and a monthly certification process for employment agencies.
Importantly, labor regulation for other types of employment did not change during the period
under study. Only one other reform—called “Nueva Justicia Laboral”— was enacted two years later
in 2009 (see Marza´n (2009) for details). This reform changed the procedures to solve labor disputes
from written to oral trials and increased the number of labor courts from twenty to eighty-four to
improve the enforceability of labor regulations. However, this reform made no distinction between
permanent and agency workers, and therefore it should not confound the effects of TAW regulation.
The effects of the TAW regulation show up immediately in aggregate data for Chilean manu-
facturing plants. Figure 1 below plots the share of agency workers involved in plants’ production
process in this sector by year (gray bar). We observe that the share of TAW steadily increased
until 2006, when it reached 0.13, and decreased thereafter post-reform. By the end of the sample
period (2011), TAWs represent only a 0.10 of plants’ total employment. Taking a closer look at the
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aggregate dynamics, we perform an accounting exercise that decomposes the aggregate evolution
of the employment-weighted average of the percentage of agency workers in the user plants (“TAW
share”) around the time of the regulation, as follows:
TAW Share =
∑
i∈U TAWi∑
i∈U (TAWi +Ri) +
∑
i/∈U Ri
=
∑
i∈U TAWi∑
i∈U (TAWi +Ri)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Weighted Avg. TAW Share in TAW-users
×
∑
i∈U (TAWi+Ri)
NU∑
i∈U (TAWi+Ri)+
∑
i/∈U Ri
NU+N−U︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rel. Size of TAW-users
× NU
NU +N−U︸ ︷︷ ︸
Share of TAW-users
, (1)
where TAWi is the number of temporary agency workers and Ri is the number of regular workers
in plant i. U indicates TAW-user plants, and the terms NU and N−U denote the number of TAW-
users (plants with TAWi > 0) and TAW-nonuser (plants with TAWi = 0), respectively. Equation 1
decomposes the TAW share in the manufacturing sector into three components: first, the weighted
average of the share of TAW in user plants; second, the size of TAW-user plants relative to all
plants in the manufacturing sector; and third, the share of TAW-user plants.
Figure 1 highlights the evolution of both the extensive (share of TAW-user plants) and the
intensive margins (TAW share in TAW-users and relative size of TAW-user plants). The TAW
regulation is correlated with both a decrease in the percentage of plants using agency works and an
increase in the relative size of those plants. Also, in plants using TAW, the employment-weighted
average TAW share decreased after 2006. Figure 1 suggests that the TAW regulation increased
both the relative cost of agency workers vis-a`-vis regular workers (decrease in the intensive margin)
and the fixed cost of having agency workers (decrease in the number of plants using TAW and
increase in the relative size of plants using them). In the following sections, we explore these data
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in greater depth.
3 Data
Our analysis is performed using data from the National Annual Manufacturers Survey (hereafter
referred to by its Spanish acronym, ‘ENIA’) collected by the National Institute of Statistics of Chile
(INE). The ENIA is an annual survey of plant-level data that encompasses all manufacturing plants
with 10 or more employees and accounts for approximately half of total manufacturing employment
in Chile. The survey started in 1979, but it has only recorded information on agency workers since
2001. Among the plants’ characteristics, we observe the number of employees (separated between
regular and agency workers), the value of raw materials used in plants’ production processes, energy
consumption, sales, exports, imports, output, value added, and profits. We also have plants’ indus-
try classification codes according to the International Standard Industrial Classification revision
3. Moreover, using data from 1995, we can construct a proxy for plant volatility as the standard
deviation of the five lags of the log difference in value added. Appendix A presents more details
about this dataset, the variable definitions, and descriptive statistics.
It is worth noting that employment data on agency workers refers to employees who perform
jobs equivalent to those performed by regular workers; accordingly, we do not study wholly out-
sourced functions such as cleaning, food services, or security tasks. This distinction is important
since it allows us to focus on workers who are close substitutes to each other, not complements who
might perform different tasks within the firm, as in Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2017).
Table 1 presents the number of observations, the sample means, and the standard deviation of
the main variables used in our analysis: total employment, temporary agency work, log output,
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and profits over nominal output. We divide the sample into four groups: plants with and without
agency workers, before and after the 2007 reform. For the whole period, we have 53,846 plant-year
observations, 60% in the pre-reform period and 40% in the post-reform. Plants with at least one
TAW represent 18% of total observations. In the pre-reform period, 19% of firms had at least one
TAW; this fell to 17% in the post-reform period.
During the post-reform period, the average plant with at least one TAW became larger relative
to other plants without any TAW. Plant size, measured by total employment, increased from 60
to 65 workers for plants without TAW. For plants with at least one agency worker, the number
of employees increased from 139 to 219. The difference in size between plants with and without
TAW, before and after the reform, is 74 employees. These figures hold if we measure size using
the log output; likewise, all these differences are statistically significant. Considering any of these
measures, plants using TAW are larger than plants without TAW in the pre-reform period, and
the difference in size increases during the post-reform period. The number of TAWs per plant,
conditional to TAW>0, also increases from 39 to 62, a 57% increase similar to the increase in total
employment per plant (conditional to TAW>0). Profits over output increased from 4% to 5.2%
among plants with at least one TAW. For plants without TAW, profit decreases from 3.8% to 3.2%.
Finally, we do not observe significant aggregate changes in output between these groups of plants.
Confirming previous results in the literature, our data shows a strong monotonic and positive
relationship between volatility and the share of TAW. We also found a strong correlation between
plant size and the use of at least one TAW. The contour diagram in Figure 2 summarizes these
findings. We compute plant size as total employment and volatility as the standard deviation of
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the five lags of the log difference in value added.6 We divide plant-year observations into twenty
equal-sized groups (20-quantiles) by plant size and volatility.7
For plants in the lowest quantile of volatility, the employment-weighted average of the percentage
of agency workers in the plants (TAW share) is the smallest (1%), while plants in the top quantile
present the highest share of TAW (16%). Moreover, plants that show higher volatility have a higher
probability of hiring at least one TAW, relative to plants that face lower volatility. This probability
goes from 11% in the first quantile to 22% in the top quantile. Appendix A shows that the simple
average of the TAW share is also lower in the first quantile (around 20%) than in the 20th quantile
(31%) for TAW-users. All of these results are consistent with the idea that plants use TAW to cope
with volatility, as has been suggested by previous research (e.g., Jahn and Bentzen, 2010; Hirsch
and Mueller, 2012; Ono and Sullivan, 2013). Appendix A also shows that in the lowest quantile
of plant size, the TAW share is only 1%, while in the top quantile the TAW share exceeds 13%.
There is also a steep monotonic relationship between plant size and the use of at least one TAW. In
the lowest quantile, only 2.6% of plants use TAW, whereas in the top quantile, more than 45% of
plants use TAW. However, when focusing on the share of TAW among TAW users, we observe a U
shape, without substantial differences across quantiles. We interpret these patterns as suggestive
evidence of fixed costs for using agency workers. These could be fixed costs in the hiring process,
higher regulatory burden for large firms due to more government supervision, or larger reputational
effects.
6The standard deviation of log value added might capture the volatility faced by plants as well as the use of
temporary agency workers (bidirectional causality). In Appendix B we propose an instrument to avoid the reverse
causality between temporary agency workers and volatility. In this part we present only raw data.
7See Appendix A for a complete description of these results.
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4 Impact of the TAW regulation
This section presents the main empirical analysis. First, we evaluate the effects of the 2007 reform
on the extensive and intensive margins of TAW use. We provide strong evidence of a decrease
in the intensive and extensive margins of agency work in the year the reform is enacted. Our
analyses control for plant size and volatility, two important determinants of the use of TAW.
Second, we study the impact of extended employment protection on several measures of plant
performance, including total employment, output, and profits. We find that firms using TAW
before the reform substituted away from agency workers towards regular employees. Nevertheless,
these plants experienced negative scale effects on total employment, output, and profits.
4.1 Effects on TAW use
We study the effects of the 2007 labor reform on the use of TAW. Building on previous literature,
we account for plant size and volatility.8 We study both extensive and intensive margins of TAW
use. Specifically, we estimate:
Yit = γt + µs + α1σit + β1Sizei + α2σit ×Dref + β2Sizei ×Dref + ρ′Xit + vit, (2)
where Yit represents both a discrete variable that equals 1 if plant i uses agency workers in year t
and a continuous variable that corresponds to the share of TAW in plant i in year t. To estimate
the effects on the former, we use a Probit model, and to assess the effects on the latter, we use
a Tobit model. For simplicity, we assume that the outcome variable is a linear function of plant
volatility σit and plant size Sizei, and that these variables interacted with the post-reform dummy
Dref that equals one for all t ≥ 2007. We divide all plant-year observations into five groups by
8Previous results in the literature include Abraham and Taylor (1996), Jahn and Bentzen (2010), Hirsch and
Mueller (2012), Aleksynska and Berg (2016) and Jahn and Weber (2016).
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size, according to their total employment in 2003, four years before the regulation. . Then, we
define Sizei as a dummy variable equal to one for plants in the top size quantile. To prevent any
remaining omitted variable bias when estimating this model, we add year fixed effects γt, sector
fixed effects µs and a set of control variables Xit, including real exchange rate and its interactions
with import/export shares, as well and input prices (manufacturing wage index and the energy
price index) interacted with its input shares. 9
It is worth noting that using variation in output as a proxy measure for volatility may give us
a biased estimate of its relationship with the use of agency workers. This is because firms may use
TAW to cope with volatility, but the use of TAW can also affect how output responds to shocks
(given that TAW provides the flexibility to adjust). To overcome this issue of bi-directional causal-
ity, we construct an instrument for plant-level volatility. Specifically, we use the fitted value of the
log difference in value-added obtained from a regression of value added on input and import/export
shares multiplied by the log change in prices (input prices and real exchange rate). Under the as-
sumption that firms are price takers, the proxy for volatility that we obtain is exogenous to plant
behavior, and therefore we eliminate the reverse causality problem. Thus, we use the standard
deviation calculated using five lags of the fitted value of the log difference in value added as our
proxy for volatility.10 Appendix B presents a complete description of this instrument. However,
we still must control for the effect of a shock on the decision to use additional agency workers in
the short-run. For example, if a firm faces an exogenous transitory positive shock, both the use
of TAW and our measure of external volatility might increase in the short-run. For the volatility
9The national statistical institute reports the manufacturing wage index and the energy price index. The Central
Bank of Chile report Chile’s real exchange rate (1986=100). The energy share is the ratio between nominal expendi-
ture in energy and nominal output. Export share is the ratio between plant exports (in pesos) and nominal output.
Input imported share is the ratio between nominal imported inputs (in pesos) and nominal output.
10We compute: SD( ˆdlvait) =
(∑5
h=1(
ˆdlvait−h − ˆdlvait)2/5
)1/2
, where ˆdlvait is the predicted value of the log
change of value added. Also, notice that out proxy for volatility uses the same log difference in input prices for each
plant in a given sector-year, and it also uses the same log difference of sector output price at the time-sector level.
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coefficient not to capture this effect, we use the fitted value of the log difference in value added and
two additional lags.
The top quantile size variable is intended to capture the economy of scale, or fixed frictions in
the use of TAW. To construct this binary size proxy, we use the total employment pre-reform (in
2003) for plant size instead of the current level.11 This avoids reverse causality between short-term
demand changes and the share of TAW around its average/expected level. It accounts for addi-
tional TAW use by firms in response to a transitory positive shock. In that case, we would find a
correlation between TAW use and plant size that is not related to the economy of scale in hiring
or using agency workers, but with the economic cycle. We control this last effect with the two lags
of the predicted log change value added.
Table 2 presents the estimation results obtained using the described proxies for volatility and
plant size. Columns (1) to (3) present the estimates from the Probit model used to analyze the
extensive margin. Column (1) assumes the effect of volatility and size on the probability to use at
least one TAW does not change with the reform. Under this assumption, the reform only affects
year-dummies. One standard deviation in our measure of volatility (0.02) increases the probability
to use at least one TAW by 0.8 percentage point, an economically significant impact if we consider
that in the sample only 11% of plants use TAW in a given year in the pre-reform era. Regarding
plant-size effect, the coefficient on the top-size dummy has the expected sign, with larger plants
having a higher probability of using agency workers. The marginal effect of moving to the top
quantile, computed at the mean value of variables, is 14 percentage points.
11We classify plants that enter to the sample post 2003 as small (size dummy equals to 0). Results are robust to
exclude new entrants post 2003, and to alternative definitions of firm size, such as considering the top quartile instead
of top quantile. Tables are available upon request.
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Columns (2) and (3) interact volatility and size proxy with a reform dummy (t ≥ 2007). The
main effect of volatility and its interaction with the post-reform period have the expected positive
sign. The joint significance test rejects the hypothesis that both volatility terms are equal to 0 at
1%, but the coefficients are not independently significant at standard levels. It is interesting to
note that after the reform, the marginal effect of moving to the group of larger plants increases
from 13.4 to 15.9 percentage points. This result is consistent with the idea that the 2007 reform
increased the fixed costs of using TAW, with the greatest effect on plants at the margin between
using TAW or not. Size becomes a more important determinant of TAW.
Columns (4) to (6) show the results from the Tobit model used to study the intensive margin.
Under the assumption that the effect of volatility and size on the share does not change after the
reform, Column (4) shows that the conditional mean marginal effect of a one percent increase in
plant volatility is 0.4 percentage points. This effect is statistically significant given a pre-reform
TAW share of 20 percentage points, among plants who use TAW. Columns (5) and (6) allow for
a heterogeneous effect of volatility pre and post-reform. Volatility interacted with the post-reform
dummy is not statistically different from 0 at standard levels. The effect of the reform on plants
facing different levels of volatility is not obvious. Under the assumption that plants use TAW to
deal with volatility and to circumvent labor regulations, the post-reform coefficient should be pos-
itive if there is no a correlation between the use of TAW to deal with volatility and to circumvent
volatility. However, it could be negative if this correlation is positive. Column (4) also shows that
the average (pre and post-reform) marginal effect of moving towards the largest group of plants on
the TAW share is 4.1 percentage points. Allowing for heterogeneous effects pre and post-reform,
Columns (5) and (6) show the size effect increases from 3.7 to 4.6 percentage points after the reform.
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Figure 3 plots the coefficient on the year dummies controls used in both models, columns (2)
and (4). Panel A and B show, respectively, the estimated coefficients for the extensive and intensive
margins of TAW use. Relative to the pre-reform years, the average marginal effect on the probabil-
ity of using TAW fell by 3.7 percentage points in 2007, when the reform was enacted, a statistically
significant 16% decrease with respect to the pre-reform base of 19 percentage points. Similarly,
conditional to use of TAW, the marginal effect on the share of TAW decreased by 1 percentage
point over a pre-reform base of 21%.
Finally, in Table 3 we present the effects of the reform on the extensive and intensive margin,
estimated jointly, using a selection model a´ la Heckman (1979). A dummy that takes value 1 when
the plant uses TAW in 2001 (pre-reform) is our excluded variable for the selection model. Identifi-
cation is predicated upon the idea that use of agency workers in 2001 is a good predictor of TAW
use in later years, but it is unrelated to the share of agency workers within a plant.12 Under the
assumption that the effect of volatility and size on TAW does not change post-reform, columns
(1) and (4) highlight the role of plant volatility on both extensive and intensive margins, and they
also confirm the relationship between plant size and use of TAW. Interestingly, this two-level model
shows no effect of plant size on the share of TAW. Regarding the differential effects of the 2007
labor regulation, columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) suggest that volatility and plant size became more
important determinants of the use of at least agency workers (with a t stat of 1.5 for the size
coefficient), but do not affect the intensive margin.
In sum, these results confirm previous findings of the role of plant volatility and plant size on
the use of agency workers. More important, this section shows an economically important and
12To avoid mechanical correlation in the selection equation, we exclude the years 2001 and 2002 from the analysis.
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statistically significant effect of the 2007 reform on the intensive and extensive margin.
4.2 Effects on plant performance
We now consider the effects of the regulation on plant-level performance. We begin comparing pre-
and post-reform outcomes between treated plants, i.e. plants that used agency workers before the
reform, vis-a`-vis plants that did not use them. We start by presenting an event-study to visually
gauge the extent to which our definition of treatment could confound the results from the difference
in differences approach. Specifically, we estimate:
Yit = αi + γt +
2011∑
s=2002
βs (DTAWiPreRef × Y ears) + ρ′Xit + it, (3)
where βs coefficients capture the year-by-year difference in the outcome variable Yit between
plants that used agency workers in 2006 (DTAWiPreRef = 1) and plants that did not use them
(DTAWiPreRef = 0). This specification includes plant and year fixed effects as well as price con-
trols, and, as mentioned before, it allows us to check the identification assumptions underlying our
main difference in difference approach. For instance, if we observed that plants using TAW before
the reform were also decreasing total employment (relative to non-users of TAW), then we would
consider that a negative effect on total employment for TAW-user plants simply reflects differences
in pre-trends between these two groups of plants instead of the effect of the reform. Figure 3
plots the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for these βs coefficients, where 2006 is the
omitted year category. We focus on four outcome variables: log non-TAW employment, log total
employment, log output, and the inverse hyperbolic arcsine of profits.13
Panel A shows a remarkable effect of the reform on the number of non-agency workers, which
13We use the inverse hyperbolic arcsine function since it approximates the natural logarithm of profits (which may
be positive and negative) and it also allows retaining zero-valued observations.
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increased by 8.5% immediately after the reform. This shift towards non-agency workers constitutes
a permanent effect of the regulation on TAW-user plants. Panels B and C present the evolution
of total employment and output in TAW user plants relative to non-users. These figures show
that, before extending the employment protection to agency workers, total employment and output
were growing in TAW-user plants. After the reform, however, this trend broke and both outcomes
decreased. It is worth noting that this pre-trend may suggest that our difference in difference ap-
proach underestimates the effects of the reform on total employment and output.14 Finally, Panel
D plots our estimates for the hyperbolic arcsine of plant profit. In this case we do not see clear
evidence of pre-trends or immediate effects of the regulation on TAW.
To address potential identification concerns raised by the pre-trends in total employment and
output, we proceed in several ways. First, we account for TAW-specific trends and enhance our
model with a control function approach. Second, we study differential effects within TAW-user
plants; and finally, we estimate models with lagged dependent variable and plant-specific trends.
We begin with the following baseline model:
Yit = αi + γt + β1 (DTAWiPreRef × t) + β2 (DTAWiPreRef ×Dref) + ρ′Xit + it, (4)
where Yit represents the outcome variable in plant i at time t, Dref is a post-reform dummy
equal to one for all t ≥ 2007, and DTAWiPreRef is a binary variable equal to 1 if the plant used
TAW before the reform in 2006 and zero otherwise. We account by selection on time invariant
characteristics by including plant fixed effects αi, and following the results from the event study,
14A first order approximation for the counterfactual evolution of total employment and output in TAW-user plants
would indicate that, in absence of the reform, these plants should have kept experiencing growth.
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we also allow TAW-user plants to have a specific time trend DTAWiPreRef × t. This specification
includes year fixed effects to account for the economic cycle and a set of additional variables Xit
that control for changes in the real exchange rate and input prices, including the manufacturing
wage index and the energy price index. We interact these variables with the plants’ labor share,
energy shares, export shares, and input imported shares, respectively.
Furthermore, since the classification of TAW-user plants (DTAWiPreRef ) could induce bias in
non-trivial ways (e.g. the use of TAW might make plants more prone to mean reversion), we enhance
the model with a semi-parametric approach to account for unobservable characteristics influencing
a plant’s decision to use TAW. Specifically, we model the decision to use TAW pre-reform as follows:
DTAW ∗iPreRef = ψ(Zi) + i
DTAWiPreRef =

1 if −ψ(Zi) < i
0 if −ψ(Zi) ≥ i
,
where the observed choice DTAWiPreRef depends on a latent variable DTAW
∗
iPreRef describing
the benefits of using TAW. This heckit model requires a variable vector Zi that shifs the decision
of using TAW in the pre-reform period. We define Zi as a vector that includes the price controls
Xit and an indicator for whether a plant was using TAW at the beginning of our sample period,
in 2001. In this setting, identification will be achieved under the assumption that the use of TAW
in 2001 works as a good predictor for the use of TAW in 2006, which should be true if the effect
of transitory shocks on the use of agency workers dissipates “soon enough,” i.e. i2001⊥i2006.
Finally, as in Heckman (1979), we assume that the plant-level heterogeneity term i is drawn
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from a normal distribution i | Zi ∼ N(µ, σ).15 Under the latter assumption, we can recover the
E[i | Zi, DTAWi] from a Probit specification for DTAWiPreRef to estimate the following model:
Yit = αi + γt + β1 (DTAWiPreRef × t) + β2 (DTAWiPreRef ×Dref) + ρ′Xit
+ρ2
(
λTAW (Zi)×Dref
)
+ vit,
(5)
where λTAW (Zi) is the generalized residual from the Probit model (i.e. the Mills ratio) interacted
with a post-reform dummy. If well-specified, this control-function approach should remove the part
of the variation in DTAWiPreRef that is correlated with the error term i, guaranteeing that the
OLS projection of the outcome on DTAWiPreRef is consistent. The results from this difference in
differences approach, including the control function, are presented in Table 4.
Estimates from our baseline model indicate that TAW-user plants experienced a 9.2% increase
in non-agency employment because of the regulation. Nevertheless, total employment decreased
by 8.6% in this group of plants. Consistent with the negative scale effect, our results also show
negative effects on output and profits.16 Specifically, we estimate a 5.7% decrease in output and
a 1.3% decrease in plant profits. Estimates accounting for unobserved plant heterogeneity show
even larger effects, with total employment, output, and profits decreasing by 15%, 14%, and 5.6%
respectively. Interestingly, the unobservables increasing the use of agency workers are negatively
correlated with the use of non-agency employment and positively correlated with the level of prof-
its made by the plants, suggesting that underlying factors increasing the benefits of using agency
workers are still at play during the post-reform period, e.g. plant volatility and fixed cost to use
TAW.
15It is also worth noting that identification in this context also requires assuming linear dependence of mean
potential outcomes on the unobservable that influence the choice.
16As discussed in Bellemare and Wichman (2018), the small-sample bias corrected approximation of a percentage
change in profits associated to the discrete change in DTAWiPreRef ×Dref is given by exp(βˆ − 0.5× V ar(βˆ))− 1.
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While the previous model distinguishes between TAW user and non-user plants, it does not
control for the intensity of use of agency workers. In the spirit of Card and Krueger (1994), we
estimate the following model to exploit variation in the intensive and extensive margins:
Yit = β1
(
DTAWHigh%iPreRef × t
)
+ β2
(
DTAWLow%iPreRef × t
)
+β3
(
DTAWHigh%iPreRef ×Dref
)
+ β4
(
DTAWLow%iPreRef ×Dref
)
+αi + γt + ρ
′Xit + it,
(6)
where the coefficients on β3 and β4 capture the differential effect of the reform on plants with
a high and low share of TAW (above/below median), relative to the baseline of not using TAW
before the reform.17 This specification is helpful in two ways. First, it allows us to study the effects
of the reform among groups exposed to different intensities of treatment. Second, it allows us to
confirm that the source of variation used for identification comes from the reform. In other words,
if previous estimates are really driven by the regulation on TAW, then we should expect stronger
effects on plants that were using a larger share of TAW before the reform. Table 5 presents these
results.
As expected, all the effects in high and low-intensity users are jointly significant at standard lev-
els. Reassuringly, plants with higher shares of TAW experienced a larger increase in the number of
non-agency workers. According to our baseline specification, non-agency employment increased by
22% in plants using TAW with high intensity (pre-reform share of TAW above the median). This
effect is larger and statistically different than the effect of the regulation on low-intensity TAW
users. In line with our previous results, we also observe differential effects on total employment,
17Although this framework is easily extensible to more quantiles, we split the sample of DTAWiPreRef = 1 into
just two groups (above and below the median) to maximize power, given the reduced number of observations within
DTAWiPreRef = 1 (approximately 1000 plants in each group, as of 2006).
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which decreased by more in plants that used more agency workers before the regulation. These
differential effects on employment are also statistically different at standard levels, i.e. we reject the
null of equal coefficients among TAW-users. However, we do not find robust evidence of differential
effects on output and profits: we cannot reject the null that the effects are non-statistically different
among high and low-intensity TAW-users, although the effect on profit exhibits the expected sign.
For a final robustness check, we consider a model in first differences that include lagged depen-
dent variables and a model with a plant-specific time trend. As suggested in Angrist and Pischke
(2009), we estimate a model in first differences that includes lagged dependent variables and plant
fixed effects to control for pre-trends. Specifically, we are interested in the following model:
Yit = αi + γt + θYit−1 + β1 (DTAWiPreRef × t) + β2 (DTAWiPreRef ×Dref) + ρ′Xit + it,
where Yit−1 represents the first lag of the outcome variable. After taking first differences and
instrumenting ∆Yit−1 with ∆Yit−2 (since ∆Yit−1 is mechanically correlated with ∆it) we estimate:
∆Yit = αi+γt+θ∆Yit−1+β1 (DTAWiPreRef )+β2 (DTAWiPreRef ×∆Dref)+ρ′∆Xit+∆it (7)
Moreover, we also estimate a model with plant-specific time trend, which allows the effect of
unobservables on plant performance to change over time, as follows:
Yit = αi + γt + αi × t+ β (DTAWiPreRef ×Dref) + ρ′Xit + it,
24
where αi controls for time invariant plant characteristics and αi × t controls by time variant plant
characteristics. To estimate this model, we take the first difference to obtain:
∆Yit = γi + µi + β (DTAWiPreRef ×∆Dref) + ρ′∆Xit + ∆it, (8)
which can be estimated including plant fixed effects. It is important to notice that this model
exploits variation in the contiguous pre and post-reform year, i.e. ∆Dref = 1 only in 2007.
Table 6 presents estimates from both models described before. The odd number columns show
the results from the model with lagged dependent variable, and the even number columns show the
estimates from the plant-specific trend model. Results confirm that, despite a substitution effect
towards regular employees, the reform had negative effects on total employment. Estimates suggest
a negative effect on employment between 6 and 8 % and a positive effect on the use of non-agency
workers between 4.8 and 6.5 %. However, we only find weak evidence of such a scale effect on
output and profits. An important consideration noticed by Gorodnichenko and Sabrianova (2007)
is that applying fixed effects to a differenced equation not only tends to magnify standard errors
due to a smaller sample size, but also reduces residual variation in the regressors, thereby increasing
the variation of the error term, which might create attenuation bias due to an increase in the noise-
to-signal ratio. This may explain why the size of the effects becomes smaller in magnitude, with
the effects on profits and output becoming statistically nonsignificant at standard levels.
5 Conclusion
During the past decades, countries have witnessed rapid growth in the number of people engaged
in alternative work arrangements. Here, we have studied one of the most prominent non-standard
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work arrangements: temporary agency work, also known as temporary help jobs. The nature of
this type of employment is controversial. On one hand, some argue that temporary agency jobs
allow firms to cope with volatility while helping workers to get experience and reach more stable
employment. On the other hand, temporary agency employment is seen as a trap, a strategy used
by employers to circumvent labor regulations protecting workers’ rights. Reflecting on these con-
cerns and responding to the rising importance of new forms of labor, countries have enacted new
regulations that aim to balance flexibility and security in the labor market.
In this paper, we provide novel evidence on the economic effects of extending employment pro-
tection to agency workers. We find that the increase in costs prompted by the TAW regulation
decreased the probability of using agency workers by 15%. Moreover, the regulation strengthened
the relationship between TAW use, plant size, and plant volatility. Regarding the effects on plant
performance, we find evidence of both scale and substitution effects. Despite the increase in the
use of non-TAW employment among TAW-user plants during the post-reform, their total employ-
ment decreased in an economically and statistically significant way. Consistent with this negative
scale effect on employment, we find suggestive evidence that the regulation resonated negatively
on output and profits, although these latter effects are not robust across all specifications.
In a final note, is worth highlighting that although we estimate a negative effect of this reform
on total employment, our study is silent about the effects of this regulation on total welfare.
Unfortunately, data limitations do not allow us to study the effects that this reform had on workers,
an economically important and policy-relevant question that we hope to address in future work.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Share of TAW decomposition
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Note: This figure decomposes the aggregate evolution of the TAW share, following Equation [1]. Share of TAW
corresponds to the sum of temporary agency workers divided by total employment in manufacturing. Share of Plants
with TAW is defined as the sum of all plants with at least one TAW over the total number of plants in a given year.
Rel. Size of plants with TAW is the simple average of the number of employees in plants with at least one TAW over
the simple average considering all plants in manufacturing. Share of TAW |TAW>0 and Unweighted Share of TAW
|TAW>0 correspond to the sum all TAW divided by total employment in plants with at least one TAW, the former
weighted by the number of employees and the latter unweighted.
Source: Authors’ construction using ENIA.
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Figure 2: Share of TAW and plant characteristics
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Note: This figure shows the relationship between the Share of TAW and two plant characteristics: Plant-Size and
Plant-Volatility. We use the 5-year standard deviation of the log change of value added as proxy for plant volatility
and the log of total employment for plant size.
Source: Authors’ construction using ENIA.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Group Observations Total Employment Total TAW Log Output Profits (% Output)
TAW=0, 2001-2006
26,075 59.7 - 12.9 4
(139.8) - (1.8) (20)
TAW=0, 2007-2011
18,231 65 - 13.2 5.2
(144.1) - (1.8) (10)
TAW>0, 2001-2006
5,992 139.4 39.3 14 3.8
(255.3) (129.9) (1.8) (10)
TAW>0, 2007-2011
3,548 218.6 62 14.8 3.2
(381.8) (185.2) (1.9) (10)
Note: This table presents the sample mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) for plants with and without TAW,
before and after the reform. Our measure of profits as a percentage of output excludes the 1% of extreme values.
Source: Authors’ construction using ENIA.
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Table 2: Use of TAW: Probit and Tobit
Probit I(TAW>0) Tobit %TAW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Volatility (Proxy) 0.474*** 0.503*** 0.065 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.042
(0.109) (0.146) (0.156) (0.052) (0.045) (0.049)
Size (Above p75) 0.144*** 0.134*** 0.127*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.035***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Volatility × DRef -0.027 0.365* 0.012 0.130*
(0.219) (0.221) (0.069) (0.070)
Size × DRef 0.025** 0.021** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 2002 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.003* 0.003 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 2003 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.006*** 0.006** 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 2004 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005** 0.005* 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 2005 0.014 0.016* 0.006 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.006**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 2006 0.016 0.018* 0.005 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.005*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year 2007 -0.006 -0.010 -0.036** 0.002 -0.000 -0.009*
(0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Year 2008 -0.037*** -0.040** -0.066*** -0.008** -0.011** -0.019***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Year 2009 -0.047*** -0.050*** -0.074*** -0.011*** -0.013** -0.021***
(0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Year 2010 -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.087*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.025***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.020) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Year 2011 -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.096*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.029***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 30,575 30,575 30,555 30,575 30,575 30,575
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No Yes No No Yes
Mean Dep Var (pre 2007) 0.193 0.193 0.194 0.208 0.208 0.208
Note: This table presents estimates of the average marginal effects in the Probit model, and of the average marginal
effects on the truncated expected value of the share of TAW in the Tobit models. Size is a dummy variable that
identifies plants with total employment in the top quintile, as of 2003. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation
of the five lags of the fitted value of the log difference in value added. To predict value-added, we use the log difference
of input prices multiplied by input shares, export shares, and the imported input share multiplied by the log difference
of nominal exchange rate. All models include year fixed effects and controls for input prices interacted with input
shares and nominal exchange rate multiplied by export share and imported input share. We also control by the fitted
value of the log difference in value added and two additional lags. Year 2001 is ommited. Robust SE are clustered at
the plant level, *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.
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Figure 3: Year coefficients
Panel A: Probit model
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Note: These figures plot the year coefficients from the probit and tobit model reported in Table 2 columns (1) and
(3). These coefficients correspond to the average marginal effect in the Probit model and to the average marginal
effects on the truncated expected value of the TAW share in the Tobit model. Confidence intervals at 95% confidence
level, using robust standard errors clustered at the plant level.
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Table 3: Use of TAW: Heckit
I(TAW>0)) %TAW | TAW>0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Volatility (Proxy) 0.575*** 0.231 0.231 0.366*** 0.177 0.196
(0.116) (0.153) (0.153) (0.114) (0.146) (0.165)
Size (Above p75) 0.069*** 0.063*** 0.063*** -0.006 -0.009* -0.010*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Volatility × DRef 0.836*** 0.835*** 0.517** 0.649***
(0.237) (0.237) (0.241) (0.251)
Size × DRef 0.014 0.014 0.008 0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Year 2003 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.013 0.013 0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Year 2004 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.020**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Year 2005 0.018** 0.013 0.013 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.038***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Year 2006 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.026***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Year 2007 -0.002 -0.045*** -0.045*** 0.040*** 0.014 0.013
(0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015)
Year 2008 -0.019* -0.070*** -0.070*** 0.021* -0.012 -0.028
(0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.019) (0.019)
Year 2009 -0.028** -0.085*** -0.085*** 0.040*** 0.004 -0.003
(0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020)
Year 2010 -0.035** -0.095*** -0.095*** 0.019 -0.021 -0.041*
(0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023)
Year 2011 -0.033*** -0.100*** -0.100*** 0.015 -0.028 -0.066***
(0.012) (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.023) (0.025)
I(TAW>0) in 2001 0.294*** 0.295*** 0.295***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 27,097 27,097 27,097 27,097 27,097 27,097
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant-Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No No Yes No No Yes
Mean Dep Var (pre 2007) 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.202 0.202 0.202
Rho -0.0948 -0.0973 -0.0889
Note: This table presents estimates of the marginal effects from a Heckman selection model. Size is a dummy
variable that identifies plants with total employment in the top quintile, as of 2003. Volatility is defined as the
standard deviation of the five lags of the fitted value of the log difference in value added. To predict value-added,
we use the log difference of input prices multiplied by input shares, export shares, and the imported input share
multiplied by the log difference of nominal exchange rate. All models include year fixed effects and controls for input
prices interacted with input shares and nominal exchange rate multiplied by export share and imported input share.
We also control by the fitted value of the log difference in value added and two additional lags. Our exclusion variable
is a dummy standing for the use of TAW in 2001. Thus, Year 2002 is ommited. Robust SE are clustered at the plant
level, *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. 35
Appendix
Appendix A: Data
We use the Annual National Industrial Survey (ENIA) carried out by the National Institute of
Statistics of Chile (INE) for the years 1995 through 2011. This survey covers the universe of
Chilean manufacturing plants with 10 or more workers, although there are signs that its coverage
has been falling in the last years. The dataset also includes plants with fewer than 10 employees if
these plants had 10 or more employees in previous years. A plant is not necessarily a firm, since
they may have several plants; however, a significant percentage of plants are single-plant firms. The
INE updates the survey annually by incorporating new plants that started operating during the
year and excluding those plants that stopped operating for any reason, generating an unbalanced
panel that follows plants over time.
For each plant, the ENIA collects data on production (value of output), value added, total em-
ployment, and wages (for regular and agency workers), exports, electricity, fossil fuel (oil and gas),
direct import of inputs, profit, and other plant characteristics. The ENIA classifies plants according
to the 3-digit ISIC (Rev. 3) code, and the Institute of Statistics (INE) produces 3-digit level price
deflators and a manufacturing real wage index. The latter index accounts for composition effects
and therefore is the best proxy for the log change of the cost of labor. For our analysis, we deflate
all nominal variables by the annual average Consumer Price Index (output, nominal exchange rate,
etc.). Although the INE collects quarterly data for employment, we decided to use annual data
because other variables have an annual frequency.
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The ENIA uses the following classification for labor at the plant level:
A. Employees with a direct contract B. Employees without a direct contract:
A1.-Owner and managers B1.- Skilled and unskilled Blue Collar TAW
A2.-Skilled and Unskilled Blue Collar Workers B2.- White collar TAW
A3.-White collar workers B3- Sales outsourcing
In our analysis, we define “total employment” as A + B, and we define temporary agency
workers as B1 + B2. We do not consider sales outsourcing because we focus on temporary agency
workers who are substitutes for regular workers. We also construct the following variables:
 Plant level export and import shares as the three years moving average of the ratio of nominal
exports and over nominal production and direct import of inputs over nominal production,
respectively.
 Plant level input shares for labor, electricity, fuel, and natural gas as the “whole period”
average of the expenditure in each input divided by output.
 Plant profit share as the ratio between profit and output.
Table A1 below presents some descriptive statistics of the dataset we use.
41
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Plant-Year data: 2001-2011 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total Employment (log) 53,846 3.48 1.20 - 8.66
Regular Employment (log) 53,846 3.42 1.18 - 8.18
Output (log) 53,829 13.24 1.88 6.15 22.20
Value Added (log) 51,760 12.11 1.89 2.28 21.93
Share of TAW 53,846 0.04 0.13 - 0.99
Total Employment (log change) 43,882 -0.00 0.25 -1.50 1.44
Profit / Output * 53,304 0.04 0.14 -1.54 0.76
Inverse hyperbolic sine of Profit 53,304 6.43 8.28 -18.13 22.47
Value Added (log change) 43,882 0.00 0.59 -3.33 3.02
SD Value Added (log change) 40,250 0.49 0.38 0.00 3.74
SD Predicted Value Added (log change) 31,670 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.25
Plant-Year data: 1995-2011
Export Share 71,158 0.07 0.21 - 1
Import Share 74,045 0.08 0.18 - 1
Plant level data
Labor Share 15,766 0.24 0.15 - 1.20
Fuel Share 15,801 0.02 0.02 - 0.24
Electricity Share 15,774 0.02 0.02 - 0.22
Year level data: 1995-2011
Manuf.Wage (log) 17 4.30 0.17 4.07 4.57
Electricity Price (log) 17 3.79 0.34 3.27 4.31
Oil Price (log) 17 9.74 0.56 8.70 10.50
Real Exch.Rate (log) 17 6.14 0.18 5.78 6.43
Sector-Year data: 1995-2011
Deflactor (log) 296 4.61 0.24 3.95 5.68
Note: We exclude the 1% extreme values of profit/output.
Source: Authors’ construction using ENIA and INE wage and price indexes.
Table A2a and A2b present the share of temporary agency workers, the share of plants with
at least one TAW, and the share of agency workers conditional to have at least one of them, for
plants with different size and for plants that faced a different level of volatility, respectively. In
Table A2a, we split plant-years observation into 20 groups by the level of plant employment. In
Table A2b, we split plant-years into 20 groups by the five years moving standard deviation of log
change of value added.
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Table A2a: TAW by Plant´s Size
Plant Size Quantiles Mean Emp Share of TAW Share of plants with TAW Share TAW | TAW ≥0
1 5.1 0.009 0.026 0.356
2 7.5 0.016 0.051 0.319
3 9.5 0.016 0.056 0.285
4 11.5 0.014 0.058 0.241
5 13.5 0.022 0.088 0.249
6 15.5 0.020 0.088 0.223
7 17.5 0.027 0.106 0.256
8 19.5 0.028 0.108 0.256
9 21.9 0.025 0.104 0.238
10 24.9 0.033 0.135 0.242
11 28.9 0.032 0.135 0.233
12 33.9 0.041 0.180 0.229
13 39.9 0.040 0.187 0.212
14 48.2 0.047 0.226 0.209
15 59.7 0.057 0.263 0.217
16 75.7 0.067 0.298 0.226
17 101.4 0.066 0.311 0.214
18 147.3 0.068 0.322 0.213
19 243.4 0.084 0.388 0.217
20 701.3 0.138 0.455 0.302
Note: Plant size is defined as the total number of workers in a plant.
Source: Authors’ construction using ENIA.
Table A2b: TAW by Plant´s Volatility
Plant Volatility Quantiles Mean Emp Share of TAW Share of plants with TAW Share TAW | TAW ≥ 0
1 48.7 0.022 0.108 0.207
2 68.5 0.025 0.148 0.168
3 74.4 0.028 0.157 0.182
4 73.5 0.028 0.148 0.190
5 78.0 0.028 0.160 0.177
6 72.3 0.028 0.142 0.199
7 79.0 0.026 0.150 0.171
8 87.3 0.033 0.166 0.196
9 87.4 0.037 0.182 0.201
10 81.8 0.037 0.188 0.197
11 81.5 0.043 0.173 0.246
12 92.8 0.043 0.186 0.230
13 94.5 0.048 0.200 0.242
14 96.3 0.048 0.222 0.217
15 98.9 0.049 0.215 0.230
16 103.7 0.059 0.224 0.262
17 101.4 0.055 0.208 0.263
18 97.9 0.058 0.207 0.282
19 107.3 0.059 0.208 0.285
20 103.2 0.068 0.221 0.310
Note: Plant volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the last 5 log change of value added.
Source: Authors’ construction using ENIA.
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Appendix B: Plant’s volatility and TAW use
Equation 9 presents the model used to compute the predicted log change in value added ( ˆdlva):
dlvai(j)t = αj + γt + a1ShLi(j) × dlwmanuf,t + a2ShEi(j)dlPeeco,t + a3ShOi(j)dlPoileco,t
+a4ShExpi(j)tdlRERt + a4ShImpi(j)tdlRERt + a5dlDefjt + a6dlvai(j)t−1 + µi(j)t,
(9)
where dlvai(j)t, ShXi(j) and dlPXjt stand respectively for the log change in value added at plant
i, in sector j, at period t; the share of input X ∈ {Labor, Electricity, Oil} in plant i of sector
j (constant over time); and the log change in the price of input X (at the manufacturing level
for wages and at the economy level for electricity and oil prices). a4ShExpi(j)t and ShImpi(j)t
stand for the export and input import shares at the plant level (% of nominal output) in the last
three years, and dlRERt and dlDefjt represent the log change in the real exchange rate (nominal
exchange rate divided by local inflation) and the log change in the real price index at the three
ISIC rev3 levels (from the National Institute of Statistics).
In a small open economy like Chile, plants in tradeable sectors, like manufacturing, are price
takers (the average tariff in Chile is lower than 1%, and it is zero in manufacturing). Based on
this, we estimate equation 9 and the predicted values for the log change of value-added at the plant
level for the period 1997-2011. Following the literature, we use the second lag of the log change
in value-added as an instrument for the first lag in equation 9. Table B1 below shows our results.
Our composite instrument for external shocks is highly significant, although it explains only 1 %
of the variance of log change of value added in our sample.
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To construct our plant-level volatility instrument, we use the predicted log change in value-
added obtained before. For each year, we define volatility as the standard deviation of the last five
lagged values. Specifically, we compute: SD( ˆdlvait) =
(∑5
h=1(
ˆdlvait−h − ˆdlvait)2/5
)1/2
, where
ˆdlvait is the predicted value of the log change of value added.
Table B1: Log Change in Value-Added
VA (log change)
(1) (2)
Labor Share × Wage (log change) -2.548*** -2.428***
(0.802) (0.822)
Energy Sahre × Elect.Price (log change) -5.171*** -5.138***
(1.584) (1.588)
Oil Share × Oil Price (log change) -1.593*** -1.671***
(0.573) (0.578)
Export Share 0.024 0.021
(0.021) (0.021)
Export Share × RER (log change) 0.181 0.191
(0.246) (0.246)
Import Share -0.032* -0.027
(0.019) (0.020)
Import Share × RER (log change) -0.079 -0.061
(0.235) (0.234)
Sector Price (log change) 0.228*** 0.229***
(0.044) (0.046)
IV Lag VA (log change) 0.092*** 0.086***
(0.021) (0.021)
Observations 44,002 44,002
R-squared 0.011 0.012
Year FE Yes Yes
Sector FE No Yes
Robust SE
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: This table presents OLS estimates of equation 9, using data between 1997-2011. Labor share, energy share, and
oil share stand for wage compensation, energy expenditure (electricity), and oil expenditure, all over total nominal
output. Export share and Import share stand for nominal exports and nominal imported inputs over nominal output.
RER stands for the real exchange rate. Sector Price is the real price index at the three ISIC rev3 levels (from the
National Institute of Statistics). We instrument Lag VA (log) using its first lag.
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Table B2 explores how the presence of TAW might affect value added and output after an ex-
ternal shock. In column 1, we regress the log change of value added on the predicted log change
value added from table B1 (our proxy for external shocks). The sample period is restricted to the
period for which we have data on TAW (2001-2011). Not surprising, the coefficient for our proxy
for external shock is close to one (0.94) and highly significant, although the R-squared is small
(0.012).
In columns 2 and 3, we study the role of TAW as a shock amplifier. In column 2, the main term
for our proxy for external shock is 0.86, and the interaction term of external shock and the dummy
variable for the presence of TAW the previous year is positive but not at statistically significant
standard levels. Column 3 splits plants with TAW above and below the median share of TAW.
The interaction term for plants with TAW below the median has the expected positive sign, but
it is not significant at standard levels. However, for plants with a TAW share above the median,
the coefficient is larger (0.63) and significant with 99 % of confidence. These results show signs
of reverse causality between TAW and value-added volatility, i.e. TAW-user plants react more to
external shock than plants without TAW.
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Table B2: Exogenous Volatility and VA volatility
VA (log change) Std. Dev. VA (log change)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Predicted VA (log change) 0.937*** 0.856*** 0.811***
(0.103) (0.215) (0.216)
Predicted VA (log change) × DTAW(≤median)t−1 0.127
(0.217)
Predicted VA (log change) × DTAW (≥median)t−1 0.629***
(0.234)
DTAW (≤median)t−1 -0.001
(0.017)
DTAW (≥median)t−1 0.007
(0.015)
Predicted VA (log change) × DTAWt−1 0.138
(0.143)
DTAWt−1 0.024** 0.014***
(0.011) (0.005)
SD (Predicted dlva) 1.842*** 1.847***
(0.209) (0.213)
Observations 33,078 33,078 33,078 33,606 32,956
R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.073 0.074
Year and Sector FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust SE, clustered at the sector-year level
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: : “Std. Dev. VA (log change)” stands for the standard deviation of the last five values of VA (log change).
“Predicted VA (log change)” is the predicted value of VA (log change) from the Table B1. “DTAW(≤median)t−1”
(“DTAW(≥median)t−1”) stands for a dummy variable that equals one if the share of TAW is below (above) the
median value in t− 1. “SD(Predicted dlva)” stands for the standard deviation of the predicted last five lagged values
of VA (log change). This table presents OLS estimates using data between 2001 and 2011.
Finally, columns 4 and 5 show the identification power of our instrument for exogenous volatility.
We perform a simple OLS estimation SD(dlvait) on SD( ˆdlvait) and time and sector dummies.
As expected, in column 4, the coefficient for SD( ˆdlvait) is positive, larger than one (1.84), and
significant at 1%. Contrary to the standard deviation of the log change of value-added, the standard
deviation of our external shock proxy does not include the amplification effect triggered by the
employment reaction to external shocks. In column 5, we include a dummy variable equal to one if
the plants used TAW the previous year. The dummy coefficient is positive and significant at 1%,
reinforcing our previous results.
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